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Introduction 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreements gave birth to a far-reaching system of 
solving dispute by introducing the Agreement of “Understanding on rules and procedures 
governing the settlement of disputes” (hereinafter DSU).  Its successes were seen both in 
absolute terms, in that it seems to resolved trade disputes effectively, and in comparative 
terms vis-à-vis other forms of less successful examples of state to state dispute settlement 
(such as the International Court of Justice)1.  The most important aspects of it, are the 
obligatory character and the duty to conform, that appear to show what has not been done so 
far in international law: the enforcement2. 
However, the period of its existence has demonstrated that dispute settlement system 
still need some improvements and clarifications, in order to meet the objectives necessary for 
purposes that it was created.  Part of the reform proposals already submitted by Members of 
WTO is Article 21.5 of the DSU in combination with Article 22 of the DSU.  
 Article 21.5 is a very important article of the DSU, which provides for the review of 
whether measures taken to comply do in fact achieve compliance with WTO rules. Article 
21.5 is used in more than 12 cases since the creation of the WTO, and it is an achievement in 
respect to the GATT system of solving the dispute3.  I think going through the Article 21.5 
cases will help to have a better understanding of the advantages and the problems relating to 
the article and the necessity of having the review compliance proceedings.  The paper will be 
structured as follows: 
In the first part I am going to give a general overview of the implementation of the panel 
and Appellate Body’s recommendations and rulings under Article 21 of the DSU and the 
possibility of using panel and Appellate Body suggestions in order to prevent further conflicts 
during the implementation period (Article 19 of the DSU).   In the second part I am going to 
                                                 
 
1 William J. Davey “The WTO Dispute Settlement System”, JIEL, 5(1), 2000 at 15 
2 Chi Carmody “ Remedies and conformity under the WTO Agreement. JIEL 5(2), 2002, 307 
3 Carolyn B. Gleason and Pamela D Walther “The WTO Dispute Settlement Implementation Procedures: A 
System in need to reform”. Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus, 31 2000, at 721  
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deal with the scope of the Article 21.5 and how it works referring to that part of the 
jurisprudence created by the panel and Appellate Body, clarifying Article 21.5, during the 
dispute for the inconsistency of the measure taken to comply, (substantial matters relating 
with specific agreements are not going to be part of this work).  Part three will consider the 
timetable conflict between Articles 21.5 and 22, the so-called ‘sequencing’ problem and the 
reform proposals regarding Article 21.5 of the DSU.   
 
I.  Articles 21 and 19 of the DSU 
 
1.1 Implementation of the recommendations and rulings under Article 21 of the DSU  
 
The DSU system is a system that tries to promote security and predictability in the 
multilateral trade. It is a system that serves to preserve rights and obligations to Members 
under the covered agreements. The above-mentioned statements are based in Article 3.2 of 
DSU4 and they are reflected in the panel and Appellate Body proceedings and they give the 
meaning to the whole dispute settlement system.  
Where the panel or the Appellate Body concludes that the measure brought by 
Member States in the dispute is inconsistent with the covered agreement, the panel or 
Appellate Body recommend the party through DSB to bring the measure into conformity5.  
But it does not end like this. A complete system for implementation, like establishment of 
reasonable period of time, surveillance of implementation and review of compliance are 
provided for the parties in order to have a satisfactory solution of the matter.  Under Article 
21.6 of the DSU, the implementation period is under the surveillance of DSB, in order to 
secure prompt compliance from the party with DSB recommendations.  A part from the 
obligation to bring the measure into conformity, during the reasonable period of time, the 
party is asked to submit a ‘status report’ at regular intervals beginning 6 months into 
reasonable time6.  Article 21.3 puts the limit of 15 months for the reasonable period of time, 
during which, the party is asked to implement the recommendations and the rulings.   
  Article 21.5 is called where there is a disagreement between parties as to the existence 
or inconsistency with the covered agreement of the measure taken to comply during the 
                                                 
 
4 Article 3.2 of the DSU 
5 Article 19.1 of the  DSU  
6 Article 21.6 of the DSU 
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implementation period 7.  It contains the right of the party to solve the implementation 
problems through dispute settlement mechanism. This possibility of going back to dispute 
settlement procedures through Article 21.5 enhances security and predictability because it 
reaffirms the rule of law instead of unilateral actions taken by Members.   
Article 21.5 reflects three basic principles for the Dispute Settlement Body’s surveillance 
of implementation: (1) ‘prompt compliance’ with recommendations and rulings of the DSB, 
(2) the ‘objective assessment’ of any measure taken to comply; and (3) the ‘security and 
predictability’ of the multilateral trading system.  The principles are elaborated below when I 
am going to discuss procedural aspects under Article 21.5.  The cases solved under this article 
have been not only very contentious, but they have been also a possibility to understand how 
the dispute settlement works and which are the problems faced during the process8.  
The system of reviewing compliance is new. It did not exist before the establishment of 
WTO agreement. This is also has been used as an argument which shows that the system of 
enforcement is stronger under the WTO than in GATT9. During the GATT existence there 
were some attempt for creating a post-panel surveillance but that mechanism did not provide 
for an independent review10.  
 
 
1.2 Panel and Appellate Body’s suggestions as a possibility of preventing future conflicts 
 
Together with obligation to recommend Member States to bring the measure into 
conformity, the panel and Appellate Body may give suggestions for the ways of 
implementation11. It does not exist any compulsory obligation on this matter under the DSU 
Agreement. This is a discretionary right of the Member State. Article 19.1 uses the word 
‘may’, which means that the suggestion is not obligatory, and more often it happens the panel 
or Appellate Body limit itself to the way of the implementation, but the modalities of 
implementation of the panel and Appellate Body’s reports are for the Member concerned to 
                                                 
7 Article 21.5 DSU 
8 Gleason & Walther supra note 3, at 711  
9 ibid, at 711  
10 Jason E. Kearns & Steve Charnovitz “Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO; A Review of the DSU Article 
21.5”, JIEL 5(2), 2002, at 36. 
11 Article 19.1 of DSU reads inter alia that: [I]n addition to its recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body 
may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations 
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be determined12.  In Guatemala Cement case the panel distinct two steps of the procedures 
according Article 19 of DSU:  
First, it is the obligatory recommendation given by panel or Appellate Body, which is 
limited to give the order to bring the measure into conformity; and the second step, is in a 
‘discretion’ (emphasise added) of the defended to implement it, and the panel can make only 
non-obligatory “suggestions”.  If the means chosen by the defended do not achieve a legal 
valid solution, than the problem would have to be adjudicated under the DSU Article 21.513.  
There are number of elements that should guide the panel and Appellate Body to 
determine whether to employ this discretion.  Above all, is the principle on intentional law 
that the sovereign has the right to choose between the ways to implement international 
obligations.  At this stage the panel should make a specific recommendation as to any of 
range of permissible options14. What panel usually does is that it limits itself to a general 
stipulation that the measure is brought into conformity with the specified elements of the 
covered agreement15.  
Another problem not yet solved in practice, is that Article 19.1 does not say anything 
how the panel can make the suggestion and how far these suggestions may reach16.  The 
system gives freedoms to the parties for the ways of implementation in order to bring the 
measure into conformity, and this is necessary for specific matters in the dispute and the 
specific circumstances in that particular country.  But, the so called “freedom of choice”17 
created by the system on one hand, and the need for conformity asked by the agreement on 
the other hand, can lead to further conflicts, and if the panel can give suggestion it can 
adjudicate the measure in the first place without the necessity of having another dispute18.  
The idea behind is to prevent as much as possible another dispute, which cost for the parties 
time and status quo situations, thereby, using the panel or Appellate Body suggestions can be 
a useful mean, that will prevent future conflicts. 
                                                 
12 Geert A. Zonnekeyn The Bed –Linen case and its Aftermath; Some comments on the European Community’s 
”World Trade Organisation Enabling Regulation”, J.WT 36(5) 2002, at 999  
13 Robert E, Hudec “Broading the scope of the remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement”, at 379 in Friedl Weiss 
“Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures : Issues & Lessons of the International Courts & Tribunals”, 
Cameron May 2000, reciting Guatemala- Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, 
WT/DS60/R 19 June 1998 
14 Jeffrey Waincymer, “Settlement of the dispute within the World Trade Organisation; A guide to the 
jurisprudence” World Economy, at 1271 
15  ibid, at 1271 
16 Zonnekey, supra note 12, at 1001 
17 See also E. Hudec supra note 13 at 378  
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II Article 21.5 panel proceeding  
 
2.1 Clarification of ‘Recourse to these dispute settlement procedures’ 
 
 Article 21.5 provides procedures in order to solve the problem of compliance during the 
implementation of DSB recommendations. It reads as following: 
 
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with the covered agreement of 
measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such a dispute shall be 
decided through recourses to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible 
resort to the original panel. The panel shall circulate it report within 90 days after the date of 
referral of the matter to it. When the panel consider that it can not provide its report within this 
time frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an 
estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. 
 
It is obvious from the language used in this article that some parts of it need further 
interpretations. It is not very well understood that what does constitute ‘recourse to these 
dispute settlement procures’, meaning that, can these procedures follows the same steps as in 
original panel proceeding?  Can the argument use for the competencies, term of references 
and limits of the original panel be used also in the Article 21.5 panel proceeding?  Does the 
party have the right to appeal the decision of Article 21.5 panel, and how far can the 
procedures go?  
First of all Article 21.5 does not make any reference to the possibilities of pursuing 
consultation before going through the panel proceeding. In EC-Bananas19 case, the EC initial 
position was that Article 21.5 implied a revisiting of all stages of the dispute settlement 
procedures, starting with the standard request for consultations.  But the complainant parties 
on the other hand argued that Article 21.5 provides for an expedited procedure and not a 
‘new’ dispute20.  However in different cases consultations were used from the parties when 
the disagreement for implementation measure was faced. In the recent case, EC-Bed Linen21, 
                                                                                                                                                        
18 In Guatemala Cement case the panel went to give suggestion believing that it was the only appropriate means 
of implementing its recommendation. Guatemala was asked to revoke the existence antidumping order. See for 
more discussions in this case E Hudec ibid at 380  
19 European Communities- Regime for importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas- Recourse to Article 21.5 
of the DSB by European Community, WT/DS27/RW adopted 6 May 1999  (EC-Bananas )(21.5) 
20 Mauricio Salas &John H Jackson “Procedural overview of the WTO EC-Banana Dispute , JIEL 2000,4 (1)at 
154 
21 European Communities-Anti Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India (EC-Bed 
Linen) (21.5) WT/DS141/RW para. 2.11 
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India started the procedures under Article 21.5 by asking first for consultations, which were 
not successful and lead to an Article 21.5 panel proceeding. 
Article 12.8 gives the original panel six months period to issue its final report, in 
contrary to that, Article 21.5 gives the panel the period of 90 days22.  Article 21.5 doesn’t say 
anything about Appellate Body procedures, although some cases have been resolved also 
through Appellate Body proceeding23. The first case was Brazil- Aircraft24, when the 
Appellate Body agreed to hear the case, and it occurred afterwards in the six next cases, when 
panel judgements were issued25.  
A surprising decision was reached in US- Shrimp26 case when the panel noted that the 
United States new measure constituted compliance, as long as the conditions in the findings 
of the Report, in particular the ongoing serious good faith efforts to reach the multilateral 
agreement, remains satisfied.  If those conditions cease to meet in the future, than the 
complainant party in the original case may be entitled to have further recourse to Article 21.5 
procedure.  This lead to open ended review which can be acceptable because of the dynamic 
nature of the treaty obligations for the members, but it can creates tensions relating with 
security and predictability of the system27. 
In the original panel proceeding the party is entitled to have a reasonable period of 
time in order to implement the Appellate Body or panel’s recommendations and rulings28.  
Such a “grace period” is not established under the Article 21.5-panel proceeding29.  
The aspects mentioned above are settled in cases under Article 21.5 and each of them 
can lead to further analyses, but for the sake of brevity I am going to deal with some other 
aspects like; standing, date of the establishment of the panel, and measure taken to comply 
. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Articles, 12.8 and 21.5 of DSU 
23 Mexico- Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United State, Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by United States, WT/DS132/AB/RW, 21 November 2001. Canada-Measure 
Affecting the Importation of the Milk and the Exportation of the Diary Product –Recourse to Article  21.5 of the 
DSU by New Zealand WT/DS103/AB/RW, 8 December 2001,   
24 Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/RW, 9 May 2000  
25 Kearns & Charnovitz, supra note 10, at  337 
26 United States- Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Turtle Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by Malaysia (US-Shrimp (21.5)) WT/DS58/RW 15 June 2001, para  5.13 
27 Kearns & Charnovitz supra note 10, at 337 
28 Article 21.3(b) of the DSU establishes the possibilities of agreement for the reasonable time. In case that such 
agreement is not reached between parties , (c) arbitrators can determine it, the period should not expire the 15 
months from the date of the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report 
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2.1.1 The question of standing under Article 21.5 
 
DSU leaves open the question or whether an original panel defendant may initiate an 
Article 21.5 proceeding.  The problems is obvious, meaning that, will only the original 
complainant party starts an Article 21.5 proceeding, and moreover what is the position of 
parties that were never involved in the original panel proceeding?  
The first Article 21.5’s panel that was faced with this problem did not reach any 
conclusion. In EC –Bananas case30 the panel held that even EC, which was original 
defending, could initiate an Article 21.5 proceeding, but no finding of WTO consistency 
could be made based on the European Community submission.  As Kearns and Charnovitz 
state, “it may happen that the original defending party can initiate a Article 21.5 proceeding, 
although it is unlikely to occur in the absence of retaliatory threat”31. The willing of the 
defendant party to initiate such a process may come after Article 22 retaliation.  Such a 
situation never had happened, but the language of the DSU does not put any requirement or 
any limit for that. The language of the article asks only for the existence of the disagreement 
regarding the consistency of the measure and does not make any reference to the possible 
party initiating the process.32   
The position of non-parties in the original proceeding in Article 21.5 proceeding has 
never been addressed when panel compliance has occurred. Neither Article 21.5, nor the DSU 
agreement put any restriction about it. The only argument that one can determine is that 
Article 21.5 is related with measures taken to comply, which means that the parties must have 
a clear connection with the matter involved in the dispute.  If such measures affect the third 
country that has not been involved in the dispute, under the DSU, the member has the right to 
initiate a new proceeding and does not have many chances to go through Article 21.5 
procedure.  However it is hard to base this argument in any of the DSU articles, due to the 
lack of limitations of this respect.  One may read this DSU article as not being restrictive for 
the standing of the new party complainant, where the measures taken to comply violate its 
rights. 
The situation is much clearer, when it comes to third parties rights in the process. In 
contrary to the non –original party rights, panel has always granted the rights to third parties 
                                                                                                                                                        
29 Kearns & Charnovitz supra note10 at 332 
30 EC-Bananas (21.5), supra note 19, para 4.14 
31  Kearns & Charnovitz supra note 10 at 341-342 
32 ibid, at 342 
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to participate in the Article 21.5 proceeding, even when they were not having such a status in 
the original panel proceeding33.    
 
 
2.1.2 Reasonable period of time and Article 21.5 panel’s establishment 
 
The DSU is based on three different procedures when it comes to implementation 
period. The first are the procedures and guidelines for the establishing a compliance deadline, 
or reasonable period of time.  The second are compliance review, procedures to be used when 
is a disagreement between parties over whether the loosing party has complied with DSB 
ruling.  The third are procedures for the suspension of concessions if the loosing party failed 
to implement the WTO ruling, or otherwise satisfy the wining party by its implementation 
deadline34.  Article 21.5 tries to give guidance for the second kind of procedures.  
Under the terms of DSU Article 21 between, the time that the loosing member must 
inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations and 
ruling under the DSB, and the time the member’s reasonable period expires many months 
later, few interim requirements are imposed upon that member35. The member is not required 
to identify the measures it will seek to remove or neither implement, nor it is required to 
specify any resort of implementing schedule36.  
Under article 21.3 the party is asked to bring the measure into conformity within the 
reasonable period of time37. It is important to mention here that Article 21.5 does not make 
any reference to the reasonable period of time. It is not determined in the article when the 
parties are supposed to call the compliance panel.38.    
The problem is still open and it first arose in EC-Bananas case, and after it has been 
solved in different ways. In EC-Banana case the European Community for several months 
rejected to use Article 21.5 procedure arguing that an Article 21.5 compliance review can not 
                                                 
33 ibid at 342 
34 Gleason & Walther, supra note 3 , at 722 
35 Article 21.6 of DSU states inter alia that [t] he issue of implementation of the recommendations and rulings 
shall be placed on the agenda of DSU after six months following the date of establishment of the reasonable 
time and shall remain under DSB agenda.  At least 10 days prior to each such DSB meeting, the Member 
concerned shall provide the DSB with the status report in writing for its progress in implementation of the 
recommendations and rulings  
36 Gleason & Walther, supra note 3 at 719                 
37 Article 21.3 of the DSU 
38 Article 21.5 of the DSU 
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be taken until the reasonable period of time expired39.  In Canada-Aircraft case and Brazil- 
Aircraft case the parties voluntarily agreed to ask for Article 21.5 proceeding after the 
expiration of the reasonable period of time40.  In EC- Bed linen case India asks for recalling 
the original panel on 8 March 2002 and the expiration of the reasonable period of time for EC 
was 14 August 200141.  
The language of Article 21.5 is too broad to allow the panel to take place during the 
reasonable time.  If such thing may happen is a good achievement not only to give meaning 
the time limit provided in Article 22.2 but also to secure short process that is always 
necessary in trade matters.  One of the reasons that such a solution is hardly to be achieved is 
that not very often parties implement the DSB recommendation within reasonable time42.   
In contrary to that, Article 22.2 gives the party 20 days after the expiration of the 
reasonable time to ask DSB for authorisation of retaliation where non-compliance occurs. 
Once the dispute goes through Article 21.5 panel’s proceeding it is understandable that the 
period of 20 days can be expired and normally can lead to the situation that the timetable of 
Article 22.2 becomes meaningless. Giving possibilities to Members to adjudicate compliance 
(Article 21.5) on one hand, and making the article 22 time limit useless on the other hand, has 
created the so called ‘sequencing’ problem, that became visible at the Bananas III case.  
 
 
2.1.3 Measures taken to comply 
 
 The mandate of an Article 21.5 panel extends to dispute over the consistency of the 
measure taken to comply.  Article 21.5 gives the panel three important objectives regarding 
that measure. First it must determine whether is a disagreement between the parties, second 
whether measures taken to comply have ‘existence’ and whether such measures manifest 
‘consistency’ with the rules in WTO agreements43.   The Article 21.5 panel is not allowed to 
examine the so-called replacement measure or the new measure with the same restrictive 
effect as old measure.  This rises to competing objective. On one hand a responding party may 
argue legitimately that the new measure should not be adjudicated on the basis of 90 days 
                                                 
39 EC-Bananas (21.5) supra note 19 
40 Canada-Measure Affecting the Export of Civil Aircraft, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, 
WT/DS70/RW 9 May 2000 para 1.6   Brazil-Aircraft,(21.5) supra note 24 para 1.5  
41  EC-Bed Linen (21.5), supra note 21, para 2.11 
42 Cherise M. Walles and Brendan P. McGivern, “The right to retaliate under the WTO Agreement : The 
Sequencing Problem”, J.W.T 2000 5(2) at 66 
43 Kearns &Charnovitz supra note 10,  at 335 
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proceeding44.  On the other hand the responding party should not be entitled to avoid 
implementation by enacting a new measure with the same trading inhibiting effect as the 
previously impugned measure, thereby seeking to deny the complainant party of its right to 
proceed retaliation. Article 21.5 did little to solve this matter45.  
Definition of the measure under the “term of panel jurisdiction” and the limit of this 
jurisdiction has been always a matter of ruling in panel and Appellate Body 
recommendations.  Part of it has been solved through the reach jurisprudence of the WTO.  A 
measure in the meaning of trade dispute can be any law regulation, which is contrary to the 
obligations of the agreement and creates distortion in the trade.  However not every measure 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Panel. With respect of identifying the measure, panel and 
Appellate Body have developed different standards for satisfying Article 6.2 of the DSU 
requirements.  The standards include that the measure is expressly identified in the request for 
establishment of the panel for example; 1) the name the date of publication, 2) is subsidiary or 
flows from an identified measure that has focused and specific delegation on implementing 
power, 3) is closely related to such narrowly-focused, identified measure46.  
The problem is a bit different when we talk about Article 21.5-panel proceeding.  The 
Panel in Australia- Salmon case stated that it is not going to give a definition of what is the 
measure taken to comply in order to be applied in all cases47.  The panel tried to solve the 
problem by referring to the context of the dispute.  In this case panel ruled out that ‘not only 
the measures explicitly express in the request of the panel can be examine by it, but also the 
measures that they are closely related or subsidiary to the measures specifically mentioned in 
the request for the panel48.  The panel defined the “compliance as an ongoing process and 
once it has been identified as such, any measure taken to be comply can be fall under the 
panel mandate unless a genius lack of notice can be pointed to”(emphasise added)49.  Under 
the jurisprudence of the panel decisions, can be classified as the measures taken to comply, 
measures that have ‘a clear connection’ with measures challenge in the original panel.  This 
test was first use by the panel in Australia –Salmon case, when the panel found the Tasmanian 
                                                 
44 Article 21.5 gives the Panel a period of 90 days to deliver its decision. 
45  Walles & Mc Givern, supra note 42, at  64 
46 James Cameron &Stephen J. Orava “GATT/WTO Panels Between Recording and finding facts: Issues of Due 
Process, Evidence, Burden of Proof, and Standard of review in GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, at 212 in, Friedl 
Weiss “Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues n& Lessons of the International Courts & 
Tribunals”, Cameron May 2000.  
47 Australia- Measure Affecting the Importation of Salmon- Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada 
Australia-Salmon(21.5)),WT/DS/18/RW, adopted 16 June 1999,para 23 
48 ibid Australia –Salmon (21.5) para 26 
49 ibid at para 28 
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measure was a measure taken to comply.  In the original dispute the panel concluded that 
Australian measures were inconstant with Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement by 
prohibiting the importation of chilling and freezing salmon from Canada50.  
No party has the right to determine what constitutes a measure taken to comply, 
although they can be mentioned in the request for establishment of the panel.  In EC-Bed 
Linen case the panel stated that India was right on arguing that EC could not decide what 
constitute that measure, but only the panel can make the final determination51.  In this case the 
panel went a bit further from the ruling that it made in Australia- Leather case.  In the latter 
case’s decision, the panel stated that in WTO panels proceeding, the complainant determines 
which measures are in dispute.  Under this approach, Article 21.5 permits the compliant to 
delineate the scope of Article 21.5 review52.  Measure included in compliance request for 
establishing of the panel can help the panel in determining the measure taken to comply, but 
they could not be definitive measure fallen in the jurisdiction of the Article 21.5 panel53.  
It is obvious that the panel should examine only the measure relating to the DSB 
recommendations.  In the case of measure taken to comply the following standards can be 
taken into consideration from the panel once it has to determined it: (1) they are linked in 
official government statement; (2) are enacted or adopted within the reasonable period of 
time; (3) affect the specially target the same products or same producers; (4) are enacted or 
adopted by the same legislative body; (5) are in the same general nature54.  
 
2.1.4 Relevant date for assessing the inconsistency of the measures taken to comply  
 
The key jurisdictional question is whether the panel is bound to limit itself to the 
measures as existing at the time of the request, or whether it may instead consider the 
modified provisions. In US- Shrimp turtle case the panel noted the DSU in silent as to the date 
on which the existence or consistency of the measure must be assessed.  On one hand it can 
be the date of the finishing of the reasonable period time, determined under the term of 
Article 21.3 and on the other hand, based on article 3.3 of DSU essential to the effective 
function of the WTO and the maintenance of the proper balance of the rights and obligations 
between the Members, it might be appropriate for the Panel to take the subsequent to the end 
                                                 
50 ibid para 4.27   
51 EC – Bed Linen(21.5) supra note 21, at para 6.15 
52 Australia-Subsidies Provided to Procedures and Exporters of Automotive Leather, Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by United States, WT/DS126/8  4 October   1999,para 6.4  
53Kearns & Charnovitz , supra note 10, at 347 
54 ibid at 347 
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of the reasonable time55.  The Panel than decided to take in consideration all the relevant facts 
acquiring under the date that the matter was referring to it, with the argument that can secure 
prompt compliance within the requirements of the DSU56.  
 The practice of the panel has been generally not to examine the new measure. No 
ruling for the reapeal measure or measure once settled was made.  However, the mere fact that 
a measure might be introduced is not in itself sufficient ground for the panel to review it. 
Member State is presumed to perform in good faith their treaty obligations57.  In EC-Bed linen 
case the panel argues first that if ‘there is not any dispute for the time when the measure is 
taken, the panel does not see it necessary as a matter of judicial economy to examine if the 
measure is been taken within this period or not’58. However the panel emphasis the ruling of 
the panel in the US-Shrimp Turtle case, that the appropriate date for assessing the compliance 
of a Member with the recommendation of the DSB is the date of establishment of the panel59. 
 
 
III. Sequencing problem 
 
3.1 Sequencing problem in the EC-Bananas case 
 
 
One of the issues that has been discussed but not yet solved is the conflict between 
Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU.  It was the EC-Bananas case when the conflict became 
visible and caused ‘the conflict’ to become a priority for resolution in DSU review60.  The 
problem raised between to articles is both procedural and substantial61.  The procedural 
problem is relating to the part of the text of Article 21.5, which leaves open the time when the 
member can invoke an Article 21.5 proceeding.  The substantial part of it referrers to the fact 
that, who is going to determine whether a defending party has failed to comply62.  
The Bananas III panel’s report was circulated on 22 May 1997 and it was the third 
time that the result was against EC. The Appellate body, with some modification upheld the 
                                                 
55 US-Shrimp (21.5)) supra note 26, para  5.13 
56  ibid para 5.13 
57 Waincymer, supra note 14 at 1225 
58 EC-Bed linen (21.5), supra note 21, at para 6.28 
59 US-Shrimp (21.5), supra note 26   
60 Gleason &Walther, supra note 3, at 726 
61 Sylvia. Rhodes “The Article 21.5/22 Problem: Clarification through bilateral agreements”? JIEL 2000 at 555 
62 Walles & Mc Givern, supra note 42, at  63 
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conclusion of the panel and the report was circulated on 9 November 199763.  Following the 
procedures under the DSU, EC was asked to bring the measure into conformity by the 1 of 
January, the reasonable time determined by the arbitrator according the words of Article 21.3 
of the DSU. The amendment that took place afterward did not satisfy any of the parties in the 
dispute and they all believed that the “new regime” of the bananas was inconsistent with 
WTO rules64.  
This was followed by lots of attempts between parties to solve the dispute through 
consultation and several attempts to reach an agreement to convene a panel under Article 21.5 
to determine the WTO consistency of the new EC regime within the reasonable time.65  On 
December 1998 the DSB circulated the request of the EC for the establishment of the Article 
21.5 panel. Ecuador submitted a separate request for an Article 21.5-panel proceeding.  In 
meantime the United States was publishing a series of notices in the federal register indicating 
its intent to seek one hundred ad valorem duties on certain product imported form the EC66.  
According to the EC point of view, as long as the Article 21.5 procedures are not 
complete, the complainant party must refrain from requesting retaliation even after the 
expiration of the implementation period.  Moreover the EC argued that retaliation could not 
be authorised on the basis of a unilateral determination from the parties, unless the DSB 
adopts a panel or Appellate Body reports finding the implementing measures to be WTO 
inconsistent67.  
On the other hand United State based its legal argument following Article 22.2 and 
22.6 of DSU emphasising the right of the prevailing party to seek retaliation within 20 days of 
the expiration of the reasonable time, and if this period was missed, than the negative 
consensus rule would lapse68.  Two weeks after the expiration of the reasonable time, the 
United States filed a communication before the DSB requesting authorisation to suspend tariff 
concession and related obligations to the EC, covering trade amount of US $ 520 million69.  
It is true that the language of Article 21.5 makes no reference to Article 22 of DSU.  
On one hand it gives the Panel 90 days to deliver its report, and on the other hand Article 22.2 
                                                 
63 EC-Bananas WT/DS27/AB/R 
64 For more details about the dispute see Salas & H Jackson ,supra note 20, 145-166 
65 Walles & McGivern supra note 42, at 72  
66 Michelle M Mulvena “Has the WTO gone Bananas? How the bananas dispute has tested the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism” New England International and Comparative Law, Vol.7 2001 at186 
67 Norio Komuro, “The EC Bananas regime and Judicial control”, J.WT 2000 at 31-32, citing Request for 
authorization interpretation pursuant to article IX.2 of the Marrakech Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Communication from European Communities, WT/GC/W/133, 25 January 1999.  
68 Walles &Mc Givern, supra note 42, at 72 
69 Salas &H Jackson , supra note 20 at 157-158  
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provides the right of the party to ask DSB for the authorisation of retaliation after 20 days of 
expires of reasonable time70.  How the DSU drafters intended the timetable to be reconciled 
within the timetable of potentially protracted compliance review pursuant to Article 21.5, is 
nowhere clarified in the text.  The Article 21.5 panel refused to settle this problem because it 
said that is a DSU revision matter and not a panel proceeding matter71.   
The dispute was solved in Article 21.5 panel procedures.  The same panel was serving 
as arbitrators in order to determine the level of retaliation.  The panel and arbitrators 
concluded their work in the same date72, respectively panel found that the measure was WTO 
inconsistent and the arbitrators confirmed the US right to retaliate73, and evaluated the level 
of retaliation74.  
The solution under which the dispute was solved seemes to be not a ‘solution’ where 
the non-compliance cases occurred afterwards. Although the panel refused to rule on the 
matter by passing the problem to the DSU review meetings, it still working like this for a 
quite a period of time. The proposals for clarifyng the problem submitted already by the 
countries in the ministerial conferences were never adopted75 
 
3.2 Sequencing problem after the Bananas Case 
 
As I mentioned above Article 21.5 was invoked in more than 12 cases and the conflict 
between this article and Article 22 of the DSU arose in other cases like Australia –Lather76, 
Brazil-Aircraft and Canada- Aircraft.  In all these cases the parties to the dispute reached an 
‘agreement’ on the application of Articles 21.5 and 22, expressed in the document seeking 
recourse77.  The DSB endorsed these agreements pursuant to these requests under Article 21.5 
proceeding78  Similarly to that in US- Shrimp case, the United State and Malaysia reached 
                                                 
70  Article 22.6 of DSU 
71 EC-Bananas Case (21.5 by Ecuador), supra note 19 
72 On the 6 April 1999 the panel announced to the parties its final work concerning: article 21.5 requested file by 
EC, Article 21.5 requested file by Ecuador and arbitration award requested by EC , pursuant to article 22.6 of 
DSU  
73 The Arbitrators determined that they were allowed to study the inconsistency of the banana regime (which 
was basically an article 21.5 matter) under an article 22.6 procedure, and so they found no reason to wait until an 
article 21.5 panel determination was reached. See Salas & H Jackson, supra note 20 at 160. 
74 WT/DS27/46 Request by EC for the Arbitration under DSU article 22.6  
75 Japan submitted its proposal in November 1999 in the Ministerial Conference held in Seattle, but the proposal 
was not discussed due to the collapse of the Seattle conference. See Komuro , supra note 67, at 37 
76 Australia-Leather(21.5), supra note 52 
77 Rhodes supra note 61 at 556  
78 ibid, Rhodes  556 
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such an agreement, although neither party has sought recource to Articles 215 or 2279.  In 
Australia- Salmon case, the parties agreed to initiate current procedures under Articles 21.5 
and 22.6. Since that the panellist and the arbitrators ruled that their review will not produce a 
ruling seven months after the expiration of the reasonable time80.  In three other instances81 
the parties have voluntarily agreed to undertake an Article 21.5 review prior to initiate 
procedures to suspend concessions, thereby entirely waiving the Article 22 timetable for 
negative consensus approval82.   
EC –Beef hormone case was the only non-compliance case that involved an admission on 
the part of the losing party that it had failed to come into compliance. That admission enables 
the United States to proceed directly under Article 22 following the expiration of the 
reasonable period of time83.   
However these are examples that show the attempts of the parties in the disputes to give 
solution for the sequencing problem.  As a conclusion we can say that almost in all cases 
parties agree on having an Article 21.5 proceeding before asking for the authorization of 
retaliation. Nevertheless such bilateral agreements do not fulfil DSU requirements, which are 
based on multilateral agreement recognised and accepted by all Member States. 
 
 
 
3.3 Review Proposals regarding Article 21.5 
 
 
The sequencing problem rose in the Bananas III case and afterwards and the need for 
other reforms in DSU, has been always in the attention of the Members of WTO, but nothing 
has changed so far. In the Ministerial conference in Seattle nothing was reached because of 
the collapse of the Conference, although Member States have submitted their proposals for 
DSU reforms to the Ministerial Conference84.  Recently, DSU reforms were discussed in the 
                                                 
79 United States– Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products , Understanding between Malaysia 
and United States Regarding the Possible Proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU , WT/DS58/16/, 12 January 
2000 
80 Australia-Salmon (21.5) supra note 47  
81 Australia-Subsidies Provided to Procedures and Exporters of Automotive Leather, Recourse by United States 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS126/8 (Oct 4 1999), Brazil –Aircraft (21.5) supra note 24, Canada-Aircraft 
(21.5), supra note 40. 
82 Gleason & Walther supra note 3 , at 722 
83 ibid at 723 
84 Canada tabled a proposal in May 1999 to be discussed in Seattle Ministerial Conference, by introducing an 
Article 21bis for panel compliance. See Walles & Givern  , supra note 42 at 82 
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Doha Round. Article 30 of Doha Ministerial Declaration85 mandates negotiations on 
improvements and clarifications of the DSU, which are to be concluded by May 2003. In the 
previous meeting Members have stated the clarification of relationship of Article 21.5 and 22 
as a key element for negotiation under the Doha mandate86.  One of the problem that is going 
to be solved is the timetable under which Article 21.5 and Article 22 are going to be called.  
The draft proposals already submitted by many countries mandate that Article 21.5 should be 
called before the Article 22, (authorisation for retaliation and the suspension). Moreover the 
party has the right to call for article 21.5 panel procedures at 10-20 days before the expiration 
of the reasonable period of time, and 10 days after the panel should be established.  A first 
attempt is done to delimit the Article 21.5 procedure, to entail less than “normal” dispute 
settlement proceeding87.  
However no one can deny the role of panel and Appellate Body in this respect. 
Although the timetable can be determined the problems already discussed in the previous 
cases are going to be called when an Article 21.5 proceeding is going to occur. The 
jurisprudence already created will help the future work of the panel during the examination of 
compliance measure and will serve in the improvement of the system.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A lesson that can be driven form non-compliance cases is that the existing DSU text 
contains obvious ambiguities and the drafting oversights need to be corrected88.  Moreover if 
one refers to cases like Bananas that took more than three years, might be right on saying the 
system is not efficient and it takes too long.  The need for compliance review seems to be 
more than necessary and the need to have precise system of reviewing seem to be important 
for having short proceedings of solving dispute. The problems are eminent when you see 
Members like European Community that hardly decided to give up form their adverse 
measures. In the last case EC-Bed Linen, the Commission argued that: 
 
                                                 
85 Doha Declaration at WTO website 
86 DSU Members discuss ‘sequencing “ and selection panellist , Bridges Weekly main page volume 6 no 19 22 
May 2002 
87Gleason &Walther, supra note 10 reciting Decision regarding the Understanding Rule and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of the Dispute , WT/MIN(99)Draft[2 December 1999], at 721 
88  Gleason & Walther, ibid at 7111 
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Although WTO rules do not obliged the Community to implement a report adopted, in certain 
circumstances the Community might find it appropriate to amend anti- dumping or anti-subsidy 
regulations to bring them in the line with such reports89”.  
 
The problem seems overcome when one analyses that, conformity with the agreement 
can be reached through implementation of measures under the DSB ruling.  Moreover the 
domestic policy would influence Member like United States to pass “carousel bill” in their 
Senate. The role of lobbies and interested groups remains still strong and sometimes leads the 
Members to take unilateral actions in the multilateral level90  
Believing that the next meeting for the DSB will solve some how the problems raising 
from the implementation of the two articles, I think that still the role of the panel and 
Appellate Body is important in developing a body of law, necessary for trade disputes. 
Preventing the conflicts can also be a very sensitive issue under the agreement. 
However good faith implementation and sanction to encourage prompt compliance are as 
much important as the solving the conflict between articles. But there has been no attempt so 
far to change it. With the enlargement of the organisation (WTO) will come also the need for 
putting more sanctions to the Members in order to maintain a balanced system of multilateral 
trade, and moreover to create possibilities of having a short dispute settlement proceeding, 
which is important for trade matters.  
                                                 
89 Zonnekeyn supra note 12 at 995 reciting COM(2001)379 final of 5 July 2001 and OJ C 270 E/242 of 2 
90 Mulvena supra note 66, at 190 
